A Postpaid Micropayment Scheme with Revocable Customers' Anonymity by Hwang, Shin-Jia & [[corresponding]]Hwang, Shin-Jia
A Postpaid Micropayment Scheme with Revocable
Customers’ Anonymity
Shin-Jia Hwang* and Chia-Wei Huang
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Tamkang University,
Tamsui, Taiwan 251, R.O.C.
Abstract
A new postpaid micropayment scheme is first proposed to protect customers’ anonymity and
provides customers’ convenience. Due to customers’ anonymity, customers can anonymously transact
with merchants and obtain the goods/services before being charged. This scheme satisfies three
properties of anonymity. First, the customer’s identity is protected by a pseudonym. Second, the
adversary cannot figure anonymous customers out by tracing their payments. Third, there is a trusted
authority to revoke customers’anonymitywhen some disputes happen. On the other hand, the postpaid
function provides customers with the convenience of using the credit to buy goods/services.
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1. Introduction
The micropayment is a special payment scheme
which is arising with the development of the elec-
tronic commerce. In the electronic commerce, the
prices of some goods/services are low, e.g. an image, a
piece of (video), or on-line information [1]. Since the
values of these payments are small, the computational
cost of traditional electronic payment schemes [210]
is more expensive than the small value payment.
Therefore, many researchers have developed some
micropayment schemes [1115] to reduce the compu-
tational cost.
To reduce the computational cost, the customer’s
anonymity at first is not considered in the proposed
micropayment schemes. Since the customers in the elec-
tronic commerce purchase goods/services through Inter-
net, the personal information and the privacy of the cus-
tomer are vulnerable to be eavesdropped or stolen. So
some researchers start developing anonymous micro-
payment schemes.
Lin [16] and Tsou [17] proposed their anonymous
micropayment schemes in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
However, these two schemes do not provide the fair and
efficient solutions for customers’ anonymity. Lin’s
scheme does not provide a mechanism to revoke cus-
tomer’s anonymity. Without the anonymity revocation,
the customers’ privacy is protected completely. But the
complete customers’ privacy protection damages the
profit of merchants and banks because disputes among
customers, merchants and banks are unsolvable in the
aspect of the law. Tsou’s scheme provides a revocation
of customer’s anonymity but the anonymity recovery is
not convenient for customers. To recover the anonymity,
the customer has to personally apply a new bank’s
anonymous account. The personal application is in-
convenient and inefficient for customers. To provide
anonymity for customers, a micropayment scheme has to
also provide an efficient anonymity revocation and ef-
ficient anonymity recovery.
Moreover, taking customers’ convenience into con-
sideration, customers may be much willing to use the
micropayment schemes if they can purchase goods/
services before paying. In this situation, postpaid micro-
payment schemes offer appropriate methods for cus-
tomers. However, the postpaid scheme is not risk-free.
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As mentioned in Yen’s scheme [18], the risk of postpaid
schemes is that a customer has inadequate credit to pay
for the purchased goods/services. If the postpaid scheme
provides customers’ anonymity, then a trace mechanism
for customers’ debts must exist.
Therefore a new postpaid micropayment scheme
with revocable anonymity is proposed to settle the
above problems. In our scheme, a customer can ano-
nymously purchase goods/services before paying. Then
only the trusted bank and the customer’s smart card
are responsible to maintain customers’ anonymity. In
the new scheme, the benefit of merchants is protected
by the anonymity revocation while the privacy of cus-
tomers is protected by anonymous and untraceable
payments.
Blind signature schemes are first introduced by
Chaum, Fiat, and Naor [19,20]. Then Pointcheval and
Jacques proposed their blind signature schemes [21] that
are proved to be secure. Then the blind signature schemes
are used to construct the anonymity in some micro-
payment schemes.
The next section states the review of PayWord
scheme. Section 3 describes the underlying model of our
scheme, some cryptographic primitives, and notations
used in our scheme. Our scheme is proposed in Section
4. The security analysis of our scheme is given in Sec-
tion 5. The comparison among our scheme, Lin’s scheme,
and Tsou’s scheme is given in Section 6. The final sec-
tion is our conclusions.
2. Related Works
In this section, the PayWord scheme [14] developed
by Rivest and Shamir is briefly described here. Rivest
and Shamir use the one-way property of hash functions
to implement a technique which is called the payword
chain.
In the PayWord scheme, if the customer wants to
spend n paywords in a specific merchant. The customer
first chooses the last payword wn at random. Then he/she
generates the payword chain in reverse order by comput-
ing wi = H(wi+1) for i = n1, n2,…, 0, where H is a se-
cure one-way hash function. After generating the pay-
word chain {w0, w1,…, wn}, the customer signs w0, con-
catenated with the certificate of the customer’s public
key, the merchant’s identification, and some additional
information to generate the commitment. After the mer-
chant verifies the certificate of the customer’s public key
and the commitment, the customer is permitted to spend
his/her paywords in the merchant.
Assume that the customer’s latest spent payword in
merchant’s database is w0 and the customer wants to
spend wi this time. The customer sends the merchant wi,
the index i, and the customer’s public key. The merchant
first retrieves w0 from its database according to the cus-
tomer’s public key, and hashes wi i times iteratively. If
the hashed value matches w0, the merchant is convinced
that the payword wi is valid.
When the merchant wants to deposit the paywords, it
first provides the bank with the commitment and the cer-
tificate of the customer’s public key. If the bank verifies
the certificate and the commitment as valid, the mer-
chant starts depositing the paywords. The process of de-
positing the paywords is similar to the customer’s pay-
ment. The merchant sends the paywords to the bank. If
the paywords are valid, the bank adds the same amount
of money to the merchant’s account.
3. Model, Cryptographic Primitives and
Notations of Our Scheme
3.1 Model of Our Scheme
The postpaid micropayment model in our scheme is
stated first. In this model, there are five kinds of mem-
bers: A bank, merchants, customers, a trusted bank, and
smart cards. The responsibility of each member is de-
scribed below.
Bank
The bank is responsible to issue the certificate of
smart card’s public key and redeem the valid paywords.
Each merchant in this schememust open an account with
the bank before the transaction.
Trusted Bank
The trusted bank is responsible to issue one smart
card to one customer and revoke the customer’s ano-
nymity. Each customer has to open an account with the
trusted bank if the customer wants to transact with mer-
chants. In addition, the trusted bank is responsible to re-
deem the valid paywords from banks and transfer real
money to banks.
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Merchants
Merchants offer services or goods to the customer in
exchange for the paywords.
Customers
Customers use paywords to purchase services or
goods from the merchant.
Smart cards
Smart cards act as agents for the trusted bank. Dur-
ing the transaction between customers and merchants,
the smart card provides the protection of the customer’s
anonymity. With the help of the smart card, the trusted
bank transfers money from customer’s account to the
bank.
The model of our scheme is described below. The
transaction flows are shown in Figure 1. This scheme
consists of seven phases: the setup phase, the registration
phase, the key updating phase, the commitment phase,
the payment phase, the deposit phase, and the anonymity
revocation phase. In the following, the phases are briefly
described one by one.
Setup phase
The trusted bank prepares lots of smart cards and
initializes those smart cards before the customers open
accounts in the trusted bank.
Registration phase
In the registration phase, the customer opens an ac-
count in the trusted bank. After authenticating the cus-
tomer’s identity, the trusted bank issues one smart card to
the customer and records necessary information about
the customer. In order to buy goods/services with small
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Figure 1. The transaction flows of our scheme.
values over the Internet, the customer has to perform the
registration on the trusted bank and the bank in se-
quential way.
Key updating phase
In the key updating phase, the customer requests
his/her smart card to update the smart card’s current
public and private key. After updating the key pair, the
smart card sends its new current public key to the trusted
bank. If the trusted bank confirms that this new current
public key is unused, the trusted bank records the ne-
cessary information about the smart card’s new current
public key, and informs the smart card that this new cur-
rent public key is unused. The current public key of the
smart card is replaced with this new current public key.
To achieve payer untraceability, it is better that the cus-
tomer updates the smart card’s public key for each pay-
word chain.
Commitment phase
After updating the smart card’s public key, the smart
card first needs the certificate of its public key issued by
the bank. Therefore, this commitment is started for each
new payowrd chain.
In the commitment phase, the customer first re-
quests the smart card to apply for a certificate of the
smart card’s current public key from the bank. The bank
sends a token to the smart card in order to securely
transmit the certificate of the smart card’s current
public key. As long as the smart card obtains the certifi-
cate from the bank, the smart card is authorized to
generate a payword chain and the commitment to this
payword chain. By using the commitment and the pay-
word chain, the customer is able to purchase goods or
services in one specific merchant.
Payment phase
By using the smart card, the customer sends the
merchant the smart card’s current public key, the bank’s
certificate for smart card’s public key, the paywords, the
commitment to the payword chain, and an order. After
validating the certificate and the commitment, the mer-
chant could only validate the payword sent form an
authorized customer. If the payword is legal, then the
merchant sends the goods or services to the customer
and records necessary information.
Deposit phase
This phase consists of three parts. The merchant asks
the bank to redeem the paywords in the first part, the
bank asks the trusted bank to redeem the paywords in the
second part, and trusted bank informs the smart card to
recover customer’s debts in the last part. In order to re-
duce the financial risk and the communication cost, the
merchant redeems paywords periodically. Similarly, the
bank also redeems paywords periodically. The length of
the redeeming period depends on financial consideration
and efficiency.
Anonymity revocation phase
To resolve disputes between the customer and the
bank (or the merchant), the trusted bank is responsible
to revoke this customer’s anonymity. After the ano-
nymity revocation phase, the customer can easily re-
gain his anonymity back by executing the key updating
phase. The regained anonymity must be independent of
the revoked anonymity. So the anonymity revocation
does not influence customer’s anonymity seriously.
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives and Notations
The notations used in the new scheme are defined as
follows:
 B, TB, M, C, SC: The notations B, TB, M, C, and SC
represent the bank, the trusted bank, the merchant, the
customer, and the smart card, respectively.
 IDB, IDT, IDM, IDC, IDS: The notations IDB, IDT, IDM,
IDC, and IDS are the identifications of the bank, the
trusted bank, the merchant, the customer, and the
smart card, respectively.
 p, q: Two large public prime numbers p and q ran-
domly chosen by TB such that q|(p  1).
 g: The element g in Z*p is a generator of order q.
 TNB, TNSC: TNB is the serial numbers of the token
recorded by the bank B while TNSC is the serial num-
ber of the token recorded by some smart card SC.
 PKB, SKB: PKB and SKB are the public key and private
key of a bank B.
 PKC, SKC: PKC and SKC are the public key and private
key of some customer C.
 PKSC, SKSC: PKSC and SKSC are the initial public key
and private key of some smart card SC. PKSC and
SKSC will be updated by the customer for keeping cus-
tomer’s anonymity.
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 KBM: KBM is the secret key shared by the bank and one
merchant for some symmetric cryptosystem.
 KBS: KBS is the secret key shared by the bank and one
smart card for some symmetric cryptosystem.
 KBT: KBT is the secret key shared by the bank and the
trusted bank for some symmetric cryptosystem.
 KTS: KTS is the secret key shared by TB and one smart
card for some symmetric cryptosystem.
 SigSK(m): The notation SigSK(m) denotes a digital sig-
nature being generated by using a private key SK on
message m.
 EK(m): A symmetric encryption on message m by us-
ing a symmetric key K.
 PEPK(m): An asymmetric encryption on messagem by
using a public key PK.
 H(): H is a secure one-way hash function.
 Hn(m): The notation Hn(m) denotes the result by ite-
ratively applying hash function H on the input m in n
times.
 BLIND(), UNBLIND(): Functions BLIND() and
UNBLIND() are the blinding and the unblinding
functions in some blind signature scheme, respec-
tively.
 r, r-1: The notation r is the blinding factor used in the
blinding function BLIND() while r-1 is the inverse of r
to remove the blinding effect caused by the blind fac-
tor r.
 OWE: The notation OWE is a field maintained by
each smart card to records the customer’s debts. Each
time the smart card generates the payword chain and
the commitment successfully, the smart card adds the
length of the payword chain to OWE.
4. Our Scheme
Our scheme consists of seven phases: the setup
phase, the registration phase, the key updating phase, the
commitment phase, the payment phase, and the deposit
phase. The details of each phase are described one by
one here.
4.1 Setup Phase
In this phase, TB prepares a lot of smart cards in ad-
vance, and initializes each smart card. TB initializes the
values of IDS, KTS, the key pair SKSC = xmod q and PKSC
= gx mod p, where x  Z*p, OWE = 0, and TNSC = 0 for
each smart card. TB also issues a certificate Cert_of_
PKSC for the current public key PKSC for each smart card.
These smart cards should be tamper-resistant to pro-
tect the secret data stored on them. So the stored secret
data on smart cards is assumed to be secure. Since the
smart cards are issued to customers, customers need the
smart card reader to interactive with their smart cards. In
our scheme, the smart cards have to interactive with the
bank B and the trusted bank TB over networks. Although
smart cards do not have networking ability, the custom-
ers have to help the smart cards to communicate with B
or TB.
In our scheme, the communication channel between
any two entities provides authentication function to au-
thenticate the talking entities with one another. More-
over, the common secret keys shared by two entities also
provide the authentication function.
4.2 Registration Phase
If a customer C wants to purchase goods or services
from merchants over Internet, he/she first opens an ac-
count with TB through secure channels. Then he/she
personally obtains one smart card SC. After issuing the
smart card to the customer, TB stores IDC, PKC, IDS,
PKSC, and KTS in its local database.
After obtaining smart cards, the customer C first
uses the smart card to apply for a symmetric secret KBS
from the bank B using secure authenticated channels.
The application process is described below:
Step 1: The smart card uses its private key SKSC to sign
the data IDS, Application, Cert_of_PKSC as
SigSKSC (IDS, Application, Cert_of_PKSC), where
Application records some requestor’s personal
information. Then the smart card sends {PKSC,
IDS, Application, Cert_of_PKSC, SigSKSC (IDS,
Application, Cert_of_PKSC)} to the bank.
Step 2: The bank uses TB’s public key to verify the cer-
tificate Cert_of_PKSC of smart card’s public key
PKSC. Then the PKSC is used to verify the signa-
ture SigSKSC (IDS, Application, Cert_of_PKSC).
Step 3: If both the validations in Step 2 are valid, the
bank B believes that this smart card is certified
by TB. The bank B sets up a symmetric secret
key KBS shared by SC and B, and sends a ci-
phertext PEPKSC (KBS, TNB) to the smart card,
where TNB is the newest serial number of the to-
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ken. Besides, the bank stores IDS and KBS in its
local database.
Step 4: Upon receiving PEPKSC (KBS, TNB), SC decrypts
this ciphertext by using its own private key
SKSC. Then SC stores KBS and sets TNSC = TNB.
The above application for KBS is only executed once
for each smart card.
4.3 Key Updating Phase
For the purpose of anonymity, the customer ran-
domly updates the smart card’s current public key PKSC
and the corresponding private key SKSC at times. The
following protocol is used for key updating.
Step 1: C chooses x randomly from Zq
* , and computes
g x  mod p. C also uses the private key SKC to
generate a signature on x as SigSKC (H(g
x
)).
Then C sends (x, g x , SigSKC (H(g
x
))) to the
smart card.
Step 2: SC computes its new current private key as
SKSC = SKSC + x mod q, and its new current
public key as PKSC = PKSC  g
x
 mod p. After
updating the key pair (PKSC, SKSC), SC sends
{IDS, EKTS (IDS,g
x
,SigSKC (H(g
x
)), nonceTS)} to
TB, where nonceTS is a fresh nonce generated by
SC to remove replay attacks.
Step 3: TB looks for the corresponding PKSC and KTS
according to IDS, and the uses KTS to decrypt
the ciphertext EKTS (IDS, g
x
, SigSKC (H(g
x
)),
nonceTS). Then TB computes PKSC = PKSC g
x

mod p.
Step 4: If the value of PKSC is ever used, TB replies
SC a failed message to inform the customer C
choosing another x to repeat Step 1. Otherwise,
TB finds PKC according to IDS and uses PKC to
verifySigSKC (H(g
x
)). If the verification is valid,
TB replies SC the successful message contain-
ing nonceTS+1 that the smart card’s current key
public key PKSC is unused. SC also separately
stores SKSC and SKSC without modifying SKSC.
Step 5: TB finally stores PKSC and SigSKC (H(g
x
)) with
C’s recorded data in the local database.
4.4 The Commitment Phase
In this phase, via smart cards, the customer C first
applies for a certificate of smart card’s current public key
from the bank B. Assume that there is a fixed value
LIMITwhich limits the total value of transaction amounts
that C can apply. The details are described below:
Step 1: C randomly chooses a blinding factor r and uses
r to blind PKSC by BLIND(PKSC). Then C
sends {Amount, r-1, BLIND(PKSC)} to SC,
where Amount is the transaction amount Cwants
to apply.
Step 2: After obtaining {Amount, r-1, BLIND(PKSC)},
SC first checks whether OWE + Amount 
LIMIT. If the inequality is true, the smart card
rejects C’s request; otherwise the smart card
sends the data {IDS, EKBS (IDS, Amount, BLIND
(PKSC), nonceBS)} to the bank B, where nonceBS
is a fresh nonce generated by SC to remove re-
play attacks.
Step 3: Upon receiving {IDS, EKBS (IDS, Amount, BLIND
(PKSC), nonceBS)}, the bank B finds KBS out ac-
cording to IDS, and uses KBS to decrypt the
ciphertext EKBS (IDS, Amount, BLIND(PKSC),
nonceBS). Then B checks whether or not the de-
crypted IDS is equal to the received IDS. If the
above check is true, B signs BLIND(PKSC) as
SigSKB (BLIND(PKSC)) and increases TNB by 1.
Step 4: The bank B generates the token as TOKEN =
EKBS (Amount, SigSKB (BLIND(PKSC)), TNB,
nonceBS+1), where the token means a certificate
for the smart card’s public key. Then B sends
{IDB, TOKEN} back to SC.
Step 5: After obtaining TOKEN, SC uses KBS to de-
crypt TOKEN and checks whether nonceBS+1
= nonceBS+1 and TNB > TNSC, where nonceBS
+1 denotes the decrypted nonce. If nonceBS+1 =
nonceBS+1 and TNB > TNSC are both true, SC
uses r-1 to unblind SigSKB (BLIND(PKSC)) by
UNBLIND( SigSKB (BLIND(PK’SC))) = SigSKB
(PKSC). SC also informs C that the application
for the certificate of PKSC is permitted by the
bank.
After the smart card obtains the certificate of PKSC,
the customer requests the smart card to generate a pay-
word chain and the corresponding commitment for some
specific merchant M by the following steps.
Step 1: The customer C randomly chooses a number wn
and sends {wn, IDM} to SC, where IDM is the
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identification of this merchant.
Step 2: Upon receiving wn, SC generates the payword
chain as wi = H(wi+1), where i = n1, n2,…, 0,
and n = Amount. Then SC generates the commit-
ment as CMT = SigSK'SC (w0, IDM, Amount,
SigSKB (PKSC)). After generating the payword
chain and the commitment CMT, SC computes
OWE = OWE + Amount. At last, the SC replies
to the customer C the successful message. Now
the customer C is able to shop at the merchant M
in the payment phase.
4.5 Payment Phase
In this phase, the customer uses his/her smart card to
purchase goods or services from the merchant. This
phase comprises two protocols: setup payment pro-
tocol and further payment protocol.
Setup payment protocol
Step 1: The smart card SC sends {PKSC, SigSKB (PKSC),
w0, IDM, Amount, CMT} to the merchant M.
Step 2: M validates the certificate SigSKB (PKSC) on
PKSC by using the bank’s public key PKB and
validates the commitment CMT by using the
smart card’s public key PKSC. If both valida-
tions are correct, M replies to SC that the cus-
tomer C can start shopping at M. Besides, M
stores {PKSC, CMT, w0, index = 0} in his/her
local database.
Further payment protocol
Without losing generality, suppose that the current
payword and index in the merchant’s database are wi and
i, respectively. The customer C wants to buy some goods
or services worth L paywords. The payment protocol is
described below.
Step 1: The smart card sends {PKSC, wi+L, i+L} to the
merchant M.
Step 2: M retrieves {PKSC,CMT, wi, index = i} from its
local database according to the received PKSC.
Step 3: M checks whether or not i+L 	 Amount. If i+L >
Amount, M cancels the payment.
Step 4: M validates the payword wi+L by computes
HL(wi+L) = wi. If H
L(wi+L) = wi, M is convinced
that the payword wi+L is valid and sends the
goods or service to C.
Step 5: M replaces wi with wi+L, and sets index = i+L in
its local database.
4.6 Deposit Phase
The deposit phase consists of three parts. In Part 1,
M requests B to redeem the paywords. In Part 2, B re-
quests TB to redeem the amount of money which B paid
to M. In Part 3, TB informs SC to recover customer’s
debts. The details are described below.
Part 1: Deposit request from the merchant
Part 1 comprises two protocols: setup deposit proto-
col and further deposit protocol. In this part, CMT =
SigSK'SC (w0, IDM, Amount,SigSKB (PKSC)) plays an impor-
tant role. If SigSKB (PKSC) is a certificate of PKSC issued
by the bank B, B has to redeem the merchant’s request
based on the redeeming guarantee of TB. The certificate
SigSKB (PKSC) is also adopting KTS and KBS to guarantee
that the owner of SigSKB (PKSC) is a legal smart card
issued from TB. Then TB provides the redeemable
guarantee for the bank B to reduce the financial risk.
Setup deposit protocol
Step 1: The merchant M sends {IDM, EKBM (PKSC,
CMT)} to the bank B.
Step 2: The bank B finds KBM to decrypt the ciphertext
EKBM (PKSC, CMT) according to IDM.
Step 3: The bank B verifies the certificate SigSKB (PKSC)
by his/her own public key PKB, and then verifies
CMT by PKSC. If both the two verifications are
valid, B informs the merchant M that M is au-
thorized to redeem the paywords.
Step 4: The bank B stores the record (PKSC,CMT, IDM,
w0, index = 0) in his/her local database.
Further deposit protocol
Without losing generality, suppose that the current
payword and index in the bank’s database are wi and i,
respectively. The merchant M wants to redeem L pay-
words. The deposit protocol is described below.
Step 1: M sends {IDM, EKBM (PKSC, L, wi+L)} to the
bank B.
Step 2: B first decrypt the ciphertext EKBM (PKSC, L,
wi+L) by KBM. Then B finds current payword wi
and index = i in the bank’s database according to
PKSC.
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Step 3: B computes L hashes on wi+L and compares the
hashed value HL(wL+i) with the stored wi. If
HL(wi+L) = wi, B increases merchant’s account
by the amounts which are worth L paywords.
Step 4: The bank replaces wi with wi+L, and sets index =
i+L in his local database.
Part 2: Deposit request from the bank
Part 2 also comprises two protocols: setup deposit
protocol and further deposit protocol.
Setup Deposit Protocol
Step 1: B sends {IDB, EKBT (PKSC, CMT)} to TB.
Step 2: TB decrypts the ciphertext EKBT (PKSC, CMT)
by KBT. Then TB verifies the certificate by the
public key PKB and verifies CMT by PKSC. If
both verifications are valid and PKSC has been
stored in TB’s database, TB stores (IDC, IDS,
KTS, PKC, PKSC, PKSC, SigSKC (H(g
x
)), CMT,
w0, index = 0) in his local database.
Step 3: TB informs B that B is authorized to redeem
money.
Further Deposit Protocol
Without losing generality, suppose that the current
payword and index in TB’s database are wi and i, re-
spectively, where i is a nonnegative integer. Suppose
that the bank wants to redeem Lpaywords, where L is an
integer. The further deposit protocol is executed by the
bank B and TB.
Step 1: B sends {IDB, EKBT (PKSC, L, wi+L)} to TB.
Step 2: TB decrypts the ciphertext EKBT (PKSC, L, wi+L)
by KBT. Then TB finds the current payword wi
and index = i in TB’s database according to
PKSC.
Step 3: TB computes L hashes on wi+L to obtain the
hashed value HL(wi+L).
Step 4: If HL(wi+L) matches wi, TB pays B the amounts
worth L paywords. Besides, TB knows the
owner C of the SC whose current public key is
PKSC, so TB decreases C’s account by the
amounts worth L paywords.
Part 3: Recovery
As mentioned in the previous section, SC computes
OWE=OWE+Amount after it successfully generates the
commitment to the payword chain.When OWE+Amount
 LIMIT is true, the customer cannot apply for the token.
Hence, after TB debits C’s spent paywords from C’s
account, TB must inform SC to decrease C’s debts.
Suppose that TB debits the amounts worth K paywords
from C’s account.
Step 1: TB sends {IDT, EKTS (IDT, CLEAR_MSG, K)}
to the smart card SC, where CLEAR_MSG is a
message that asks SC to decrease the value of
OWE.
Step 2: SC decrypts the message EKTS (IDT, CLEAR_
MSG, K) by the secret key KTS and confirms the
contents of CLEAR_MSG, SC computes OWE
= OWEK.
4.7 Anonymity Revocation Phase
If a customer is involved in a dispute with the bank
or the merchant, the bank or the merchant would request
TB to revoke the customer’s anonymity by sending the
smart card’s current public key PKSC to TB. Upon re-
ceiving PKSC, TB finds the customer’s identity out from
its database. TB then notifies the bank or the merchant
that the identity of PK’SC’s owner is IDC.
After the dispute is resolved, the customer obtains
his/her anonymity back by executing the key updating
phase. No one knows the relation between PKSC and IDC
except TB.
5. Security Analysis
The analyses of security and anonymity issues of our
scheme are given.
5.1 Double Spending Prevention
Suppose that a malicious customer C wants to
spend one payword in different merchants. In this
scheme, he/she is not able to do this attack. Because
the commitment CMT generated by SC is merchant-
specific, C cannot use the same CMT in different
merchants.
On the other hand, the malicious customer C cannot
spend one payword twice or more times in the same
merchant. In our scheme, since the merchant records
the latest payword wi and the index of wi in his/her local
database, the merchant is able to detect the used payword
immediately.
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5.2 Unforgeability
Suppose that an adversary C wants to forge pay-
words to purchase goods or services in the merchant
without bank’s permission and the smart card’s monitor.
The security of the private keys is considered first. Due
to the computationally infeasible property of the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP), C cannot derive smart card’s
private keys SKSC from its public key PKSC and bank’s
private key SKB from the bank’s public key PKB. There-
fore, all private keys are secure. Moreover, assume that
the smart card is tamper-resistant without leaking its
private key SKSC.
With the aim of arising forgery attacks, the adversary
C must forge the certificate of an illegal PK*SC or forge
the commitment to his forged payword chain for some
legal PKSC. It is also hard to forge the certificate of an
illegal PK*SC since the certificate is a (blind) signature of
the bank. Although the payword chain can be easily cre-
ated by C, it is hard to forge the commitment because the
commitment is actually SC’s signature being verified by
PKSC. Based on the analysis that all private keys are se-
cure, the adversary cannot obtain these private keys to
forge commitments or certificates. Therefore, the adver-
sary C cannot forge paywords.
5.3 Anonymity
The anonymity is discussed in two aspects: payment
anonymity and payer untraceability [22]. The payment
anonymity means that anyone except TB only knows the
customer’s pseudonym. The payer untraceability means
that anyone except TB cannot trace the payer’s identity
of some payments.
Assume that TB is trustworthy and SC is temper-
resistant without leaking customer’s identity. The bank
B, the merchant M, and malicious customers C are the
possible adversaries who wants to recognize C’s identity
in this scheme.
The Bank B
In the commitment phase of our scheme, B receives
SC’s blinded public key BLIND(PKSC) and sends
SigSKB (BLIND(PKSC)) back to the smart SC. Because
PKSC is blinded in a secure blind signature scheme, the
bank B does not know what the value of PKSC is. After
the unblinding process, the relation between the blinded
public key BLIND(PKSC) and the original public key
PKSC disappears in a secure blind signature scheme. In
other words, the bank B cannot build the relation be-
tween PKSC and the customer C alone. The bank B can-
not identify the customer as the owner of PKSC. On the
other hand, B cannot trace customer’s transactions via
the smart card’s public key PKSC since the customer
randomly updates PKSC each time.
The merchant M
M cannot learn C’s identity or trace C’s payments in
this scheme. In the payment phase, M receives PKSC,
CMT, the payword wi, and index of the payword from
SC. PKSC is the only useful information for M. How-
ever, PKSC is a randomized public key, so M cannot use
it to trace the smart card’s owner.
A malicious customer C
Since messages sent from C are all encrypted by
some symmetric encryption, the only work C can do is
to trace C’s transactions by PKSC. As mentioning in the
above, the traceability of PKSC is removed because the
public key PKSC is randomly updated each time.
As discussing in the above, our scheme achieves
both payment anonymity and payer untraceability.
6. Comparisons
Our scheme is compared with Lin’s and Tsou’s
schemes for the security requirements in Section 6.1.
Then the computational performance comparison among
our scheme, Lin’s scheme and Tsou’s scheme is given in
Section 6.2.
6.1 Comparisons of Security Requirements
Some common security requirements for micro-
payment schemes are described below. The first re-
quirement is double spending prevention that the cus-
tomer cannot use a payword twice or more times. The
divisibility requirement means that it is possible to use
multiple denominations (in token-based system) [22].
The transferability requirement means that the customer
can spend the token in different merchants without con-
tacting the bank. The prepaid requirement means that the
customer’s account is decreased when his/her with-
drawals occur. The postpaid requirement means that the
customer’s account is decreased when the merchant re-
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deem payments. The payment anonymity means that all
other users in the scheme can only know the customer’s
pseudonym except the trusted bank. The payer untra-
ceability means that customer’s payments cannot be
traced. The anonymity revocation requirement means
that there exists a trusted bank to revoke customer’s
anonymity if the customer is involved in a dispute with
the bank or the merchant.
Table 1 demonstrates the security requirement com-
parisons among our new scheme, Lin’s scheme, and
Tsou’s scheme. Our scheme offers better solution to
anonymity than Lin’s and Tsou’s. Lin’s scheme does
not provide anonymity revocation to resolve disputes
among customers, banks, and merchants. Although
Tsou’s scheme provides anonymity revocation, the
anonymity recovery is not convenient for the customers
in Tsou’s scheme. In Tsou’s scheme, to regain the
customer’s anonymity after the anonymity revocation
phase, the customer has to register a new bank account.
Moreover, Tsou’s scheme doesn’t provide payer untra-
ceability, so customers’ payments in their scheme may
be traced.
Only our new scheme is postpaid while the other two
schemes are both prepaid. For customers, the postpaid
micropayment scheme is more popular than the prepaid
micropayment scheme because the customers enjoy
shopping before actual payment. On the other hand, the
profits of merchants are protected by the revocable
customers’ anonymity. The new scheme provides a fair
protection both for customers and merchants.
6.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, the computational performance is
measured by four kinds of cryptographic functions: the
signature generation and verification, the symmetric en-
cryption and decryption, the hash function, and the blind
signature generation. Some notations used to repre-
senting computational cost are defined below. The no-
tation sign denotes the cost to generate one signature.
The notation “verify” denotes the cost to verify one sig-
nature. The notation EN denotes the execution cost of
one symmetric encryption while the notation DE denotes
the execution cost of one symmetric decryption. The no-
tation hash denotes the computational cost of performing
hash function once. The notation blind denotes the
computational cost of performing a blinding function.
In the following, the performance of Lin’s scheme
and the new scheme is given because the fundamental
ideas of micropayment of Lin’s scheme and the new
scheme are similar. Since the new scheme is designed for
the micropayment scheme for specific merchants, the
specific merchant version of Lin’s scheme is considered.
Being compared with Lin’s scheme, our scheme pro-
vides additional anonymity revocation function and the
postpaid mode which benefit customers. Therefore, our
scheme additionally needs 2 signature generations, n+1
hash computations, 2 symmetric encryptions, 3 symmet-
ric decryptions, 5 signature verifications. Details of the
extra costs are described below.
For the anonymity revocation, the customer has to
provide evidence each time he/she executes the key up-
dating phase, therefore, the customer has to cost one sig-
nature generation and one hash operation. The smart
card uses one symmetric encryption to securely transmit
the customer’s signature and other information to TB.
TB costs one symmetric decryption to decrypt the ci-
phertext, and one signature verification to verify the cus-
tomer’s signature.
To provide the postpaid function in our scheme, TB
and the smart card cooperate to settle the customer’s pay-
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Table 1. Security requirement comparisons among various anonymous micropayment schemes
Schemes
Functions
Our scheme Lin’s scheme Tsou’s scheme
Double spending prevention Yes Yes Yes
Divisibility No No No
Transferability No Yes Yes
Payment anonymity Yes Yes Yes
Anonymity revocation Yes No Yes
Payer untraceability Yes Yes No
Prepaid/postpaid Postpaid Prepaid Prepaid
ments and debts. The customer does not need to make
contact with the bank. In the registration phase, the smart
card sends the bank one signature SigSKSC (IDS, Applica-
tion, Cert_of_PKSC) to apply for one symmetric secret
key KBS which lets the smart card securely contact with
the bank as a substitute for the customer. The bank first
verifies the certificate Cert_of_PKSC for the smart card’s
public key, and then verifies the signature SigSKSC (IDS,
Application, Cert_of_PKSC). Besides, in the deposit
phase, TB has to pay off the customer’s debts, TB costs 1
symmetric encryption, 2 signature verification, and n
hash to this work. After TB decreases the customer’s ac-
count, TB informs the smart card to recovery the cus-
tomer’s debts, and this work costs TB one symmetric en-
cryption and the smart card one symmetric decryption.
Table 2 demonstrates the detailed comparison among
Lin’s scheme and our scheme. For fairness, the com-
parison is under the assumption that one customer pur-
chases goods/services in one specific merchant.
7. Conclusion
A postpaid micropayment scheme with revocable
customers’ anonymity is proposed in this paper. This
scheme achieves both payment anonymity and payer
untraceability. The customer in this scheme can effi-
ciently obtain anonymity. Besides, this scheme provides
the revoking function of customers’anonymity. Once the
customer is in dispute with the merchant or the bank, the
trusted bank can revoke the customer’s anonymity to re-
solve the dispute. After disputes are resolved, the cus-
tomer efficiently obtains his/her anonymity again by
only updating the smart card’s key pair. This scheme also
provides postpaid payment in which the customer can
pay the cash after receiving their goods/services. This
characteristic may attract more people using the micro-
payment scheme. However, our scheme needs the help of
a trust bank to achieve both payment anonymity and
payer untraceability. To remove the trust bank is a future
research topic.
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